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Abstract 
Previous research suggested that a goal-incongruent outcome leads to more intense negative 
emotions when it is unexpected and close to a goal-congruent outcome. Until now, however, no 
studies have disentangled the influence of the appraisals of expectancy and proximity on 
emotions. We experimentally manipulated each of these variables in three slot machine 
experiments and measured emotions via differences in motivation (i.e., the tendency to repair the 
goal incongruence) and feelings (i.e., disappointment, frustration, and anger). The experiments 
consisted of a series of trials that each started with the sequential presentation of three symbols. 
In case of a win trial, all symbols were equal (e.g., AAA) and the participant gained ten cents; in 
case of a loss trial, one or more of the symbols were different and the participant gained zero 
cents. Three different loss trials were compared: unexpected proximal ones (e.g., AAB), 
expected proximal ones (e.g., ABA), and expected distal ones (e.g., ABC). The tendency to 
repair was measured online via behavior as well as retrospectively via self-reports; feelings were 
measured retrospectively (Experiments 1 and 2) or online (Experiment 3). Unexpected losses 
seemed to increase the tendency to repair as well as feelings of disappointment (in all 
experiments) and feelings of frustration and anger (in Experiments 1 and 3). Proximal losses 
increased only the tendency to repair (in all experiments). This suggests that the appraisals of 
expectancy and proximity have a distinct influence on emotions. 
 
Keywords: Motivation, Expectancy, Disappointment, Frustration, Repair 
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Unexpected and Just Missed: The Separate Influence of the Appraisals of Expectancy and 
Proximity on Negative Emotions. 
Life is filled with opportunities, maybes, and pities: the political candidate that was ahead 
in the exit polls but eventually loses the elections by a couple of votes, the tennis champion that 
plays the final of her favorite tournament but loses the last set in a tie break, the audience of 
Romeo and Juliet that anticipates a happy ending, but ends up watching Romeo commit suicide a 
few seconds before Juliet wakes up from an induced coma. Negative outcomes seem to induce 
much more intense and long-lasting emotions when a positive outcome was highly anticipated 
and just missed than when a positive outcome was never anticipated and missed by far. To date, 
it remains unclear whether the expectation of a positive outcome and the perception that it was 
just missed (i.e., proximity) both influence emotions or whether one of the two dictates the 
emotion. We present two studies in which we experimentally tease apart expectancy and 
proximity to investigate their influence on negative emotions. 
As in most contemporary emotion research, we adopt a componential view of emotions. 
This view states that emotions have various components: (a) a cognitive component consisting of 
an appraisal of the situation, (b) a motivational component consisting of changes in action 
readiness and specific action tendencies, (c) a somatic component consisting of 
(neuro)physiological changes, (d) a motor component consisting of expressive and gross 
behavior, and (e) a feeling or experience component (Moors, 2009; Scherer, 2005). In addition, 
we adopt the assumption of appraisal theories that not the stimulus itself, but the appraisal of the 
stimulus determines the content of the (other) componential changes (Arnold, 1960; Frijda, 
1986). Appraisal is a process that evaluates the significance of a stimulus for well-being (Frijda, 
1986; Scherer, 2001; Smith & Lazarus, 1990). Appraisal theories propose that stimuli are 
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appraised on a number of variables, such as goal relevance, goal congruence, coping potential, 
agency, and expectancy (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996; 
Scherer, 1988). Goal relevance refers to the extent to which a stimulus touches on the person’s 
goals or concerns. Goal congruence refers to the degree to which a stimulus matches with these 
goals (values: goal incongruent vs. goal congruent). Coping potential refers to the potential that a 
person has to turn a goal-incongruent stimulus in a goal-congruent one (low vs. high coping 
potential). Agency refers to the cause of the stimulus (values: self, other, circumstances). 
Expectancy refers to the degree to which a stimulus matches with the person’s expectations 
(values: expected vs. unexpected). Proximity is not mentioned in existing appraisal theories, yet 
the idea that it plays a role in emotion elicitation and/or differentiation is compatible with an 
appraisal view and could be incorporated in these theories. Proximity is short for causal 
proximity (Kahneman & Varey, 1990) and is used to describe the number of elements of the 
causal sequence of the current stimulus that is shared with the causal sequence of an alternative 
(here, goal-congruent) stimulus. In case many elements are shared (proximal outcome), one can 
say that the alternative almost happened; in case few elements are shared (distal outcome), one 
can say that the alternative was far from happening. 
Appraisal theorists further propose that the output of the appraisal process directly drives 
the action tendencies that prepare the organism to respond to its environment (Frijda, Kuipers, & 
ter Schure, 1989; Scherer, 1994). This preparation process has (neuro)physiological correlates, 
such as an increase in heart rate and activity in motor cortices, and can elicit actual behavioral 
changes (Frijda, et al., 1989; Scherer, 1994). A feeling or emotional experience arises when the 
appraisal, action tendencies, physiology, and behavior are reflected in consciousness (Grandjean, 
Sander, & Scherer, 2008). 
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We investigated the influence of the appraisals of expectancy and proximity on the 
motivational and the feeling components. Several emotion researchers predict that the appraisal 
of expectancy has an influence on emotions (e.g., Fraisse, 1964; Reisenzein, 2009; Roseman, 
2011). In the literature on counterfactual thinking (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982; Medvec & Savitsky, 1997), however, the idea is prevalent that proximity 
influences emotions. Our first aim was to examine whether a stimulus appraised as goal 
incongruent elicits different motivations and feelings when it is also appraised as expected vs. 
unexpected, while controlling for the appraisal of proximity. Our second aim was to investigate 
whether a stimulus appraised as goal incongruent elicits different motivations and feelings when 
it is also appraised as proximal vs. distal to a goal-congruent stimulus, while controlling for the 
appraisal of expectancy. Our third aim was to directly compare the influence of the appraisals of 
expectancy and proximity. Following construal level theory, one could predict that both 
expectancy and proximity influence emotional responding. Construal level theory builds on the 
literature on counterfactual thinking and suggests that emotions depend not only on the 
immediate situation, but also on mental construals of alternative situations (Trope & Liberman, 
2010). Moreover, this theory proposes that the intensity of the emotional response depends on 
the psychological distance between the current situation and its construed alternative. Among 
other things, the psychological distance depends on the probability of an alternative (Trope & 
Liberman, 2010). Expectancy and proximity both relate to the probability of an alternative: If an 
obtained outcome (e.g., a loss) is appraised as unexpected, this implies that at an earlier point in 
time the probability of an alternative (e.g., a win) was estimated as high; if an obtained outcome 
is appraised as proximal to an alternative, it implies that after obtaining the outcome, one 
retrospectively estimates that the probability of obtaining the alternative was high. Thus, both 
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appraisals of expectancy and proximity relate to the psychological distance to the goal-congruent 
outcome and each may influence the emotional response. 
There is a bulk of research that investigates the influence of the appraisals of either 
expectancy or proximity on motivations and/or feelings, but these studies often fail to control 
(experimentally or statistically) for the other variable. Moreover, there is virtually no research 
that  compares the influence of both variables. The next sections describe a handful of these 
studies organized according to the component of emotion (motivational or feeling) that was 
examined. 
The Motivational Component 
Previous research suggests that a goal-incongruent stimulus that is appraised as 
unexpected and proximal to a goal-congruent stimulus elicits more active behavior, more 
problem-solving behavior, and more risk-taking behavior. Most existing studies, however, do not 
allow isolating the effects of expectancy and/or proximity, nor comparing them. For instance, a 
number of studies with animals and children (Amsel, 1958; Ryan & Watson, 1968) showed that 
a violation of expectations in the form of a non-reward (i.e., the withholding of a reward) leads to 
an increase in vigor of the subsequent behavior. This line of research fails to provide clear 
support for an effect of expectancy on emotions for two reasons. First, many of these studies 
confound expectancy with goal congruence because they contrast non-rewards with rewards 
(Amsel, 1958; Ryan & Watson, 1968). Second, expectancy is often manipulated together with 
proximity. For instance, Haner and Brown (1955) instructed children to fill a marble board in 
order to win a prize. At varying distances from the goal, the experimenter pushed a handle to 
release all marbles. The closer participants were to the goal, the more force they used to push a 
plunger that stopped a noise that was initiated together with the release of the marbles (see also, 
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Endsley, 1966; Pederson & Mcewan, 1970; for one replication and one failed replication). In this 
study, participants’ expectation to reach the goal was manipulated by their proximity to the goal. 
Studies with adult participants can be found in the gambling literature on the near-miss 
effect. Just missing a win when gambling seems to increase the motivation to continue gambling, 
both in laboratory studies (Clark, Crooks, Clarke, Aitken, & Dunn, 2012; Côté, Caron, Aubert, 
Desrochers, & Ladouceur, 2003; Qi, Ding, Song, & Yang, 2011) and in real life 
(Ariyabuddhiphongs & Phengphol, 2008). Again, most operationalizations of near-misses 
confounded the appraisals of expectancy and proximity. For instance, in a slot machine game by 
Clark et al. (2012) near-misses were trials on which the winning symbol stopped at one position 
from the payline (high expectation to win, high proximity) and full-misses were trials on which 
the winning symbol stopped at a position further away from the payline (low expectation to win, 
low proximity). Some studies did succeed at manipulating expectancy unconfounded with 
proximity. Strickland and Grote (1967) manipulated the proportion of unexpected goal-
incongruent trials in a slot machine game in which three winning symbols led to a monetary 
gain. One group of participants was exposed to many unexpected goal-incongruent trials: 
Winning symbols appeared frequently in the first slot but infrequently in the last slot. Another 
group of participants was exposed to many expected goal-incongruent trials: Winning symbols 
appeared frequently in the last slot but infrequently in the first slot. They found that participants 
in the first group had a stronger tendency to continue gambling than participants in the second 
group (but see Reid, 1986, for a failed replication). 
To summarize, existing research suggests that unexpected (high prior expectations of 
reaching the goal) and proximal (almost reaching the goal) goal-incongruent outcomes are 
associated with an increased readiness to act compared to expected and distal goal-incongruent 
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outcomes. To date, it remains unclear whether both the appraisals of expectancy and proximity 
contribute to this effect or whether it is driven primarily by one of the two variables. In addition, 
it remains unclear whether these appraisals result in a general increase of motivation or whether 
they activate specific action tendencies. 
The Feeling Component 
The unexpectedness of an event often is considered a general amplifier of positive and 
negative feelings. For instance, Kahneman and Miller (1986) proposed that abnormal events 
(e.g., events that violate expectations) produce more intense feelings. This idea was supported in 
studies in which expectations were measured (McGraw, Mellers, & Ritov, 2004; Siemer, Mauss, 
& Gross, 2007) or experimentally manipulated (Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997; Shepperd 
& McNulty, 2002; van Dijk & van der Pligt, 1997). These studies suggest that it is always better 
to expect the worse: Expecting the occurrence of a goal-incongruent event (a) attenuates negative 
feelings when the goal-incongruent event (expectedly) does occur and (b) increases positive 
feelings when a goal-congruent event (unexpectedly) occurs. On the other hand, expecting the 
occurrence of a goal-congruent event (a) attenuates positive feelings when the goal-congruent 
event (expectedly) does occur and (b) increases negative feelings when a goal-incongruent event 
(unexpectedly) occurs (McGraw, Mellers, & Tetlock, 2005). In several of these studies, however, 
the effects also can be explained by differences in proximity (e.g., McGraw, et al., 2004; Mellers, 
et al., 1997; Siemer, et al., 2007). Moreover, a number of other studies have failed to show that 
prior expectations influence the intensity of positive and negative feelings (Feather & Simon, 
1971; Golub, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2009; Marshall & Brown, 2006; but see Sweeny & Shepperd, 
2010, for a reply).  
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In a variety of contexts such as sports (Markman, McMullen, & Elizaga, 2008), gambling 
(Clark, et al., 2012; Clark, Lawrence, Astley-Jones, & Gray, 2009; Qi, et al., 2011), and study 
grades (Medvec & Savitsky, 1997), negative feelings in face of goal-incongruent outcomes seem 
to be more intense when a goal-congruent outcome is proximal. On the other hand, there are 
reasons to believe that being close to a goal-congruent outcome partly releases the positive 
valence tied to the goal-congruent outcome, even when the outcome is missed (Dixon & 
Schreiber, 2004; Reid, 1986; Skinner, 1953). Near-misses in gambling seem to activate the same 
brain areas as wins (Clark, et al., 2009) and are associated with a reduced feedback-related 
negativity in event-related potentials compared to full-misses (Luo, Wang, & Qu, 2011). Again, 
few studies clearly separated the influence of expectancy and proximity (but see Medvec & 
Savitsky, 1997). 
To summarize, previous research did not produce a clear pattern of results with respect to 
the influence of expectancy and proximity on the intensity of negative feelings. The disparity in 
the literature partly may be due to the fact that few studies clearly separated the two variables.  
The Present Research 
We set up three experiments in which we examined the separate influence of expectancy 
and proximity on emotions. The experiments were designed as slot machine games that 
participants played for actual money. Each experiment consisted of a series of trials and each 
trial started with the sequential presentation of three pieces of fruit, in one of four combinations: 
(a) a win trial (AAA: three times the same fruit), (b) an unexpected proximal loss trial (AAB: 
two times the same fruit followed by a different fruit), (c) an expected proximal loss trial 
(ABA/ABB: two times the same fruit in Slots 1 and 3 or in Slots 2 and 3), and (d) an expected 
distal loss trial (ABC: three times a different fruit). Emotions were measured via the motivational 
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component and the feeling component. For the motivational component, we measured the 
tendency to repair a loss or goal-incongruent outcome. Repairing can be regarded as a problem-
solving behavior that is usually not harmful (unlike risk taking or gambling). The tendency to 
repair was measured trial by trial, by registering the extent to which participants took the 
opportunity to play a repair game on the loss trials. Participants also self-reported on the 
tendency to repair on the different trial types at the end of the experiment. For the feeling 
component, participants reported on their feelings of disappointment, frustration, and anger at the 
end of the experiment (Experiments 1 and 2) or trial by trial (Experiment 3). In Experiments 1 
and 2, the feeling component was measured retrospectively to avoid (a) interference with the 
trial-by-trial assessment of the motivational component and (b) demand effects when participants 
would become aware that we measured their emotions. In Experiment 3, the feeling component 
was measured trial by trial because retrospective measures have been shown to suffer from a 
number of biases (Barrett, 1997; Robinson & Clore, 2002). 
Although feelings and action tendencies were only measured in response to the displays 
with three fruit symbols, we considered it likely that participants updated their appraisals along 
with the presentation of each new symbol. More specifically, it can be assumed that all fruit 
symbols appearing in the first position would be appraised similarly, given that they all yielded 
an equal chance at winning and appeared equally frequently in the first position. The second 
symbol introduced novel information and may have caused expectations (AA trials vs. AB trials 
may have caused the expectation of a win vs. a loss) and appraisals of goal congruence (AA 
trials vs. AB trials as goal congruent vs. goal incongruent). The third symbol, together with the 
information that the trial was a loss vs. a win trial, may have caused (changes in) the appraisals 
of goal congruence (goal congruent vs. goal incongruent), expectancy (unexpected vs. expected), 
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and proximity (proximal vs. distal). With regard to the third symbol, we assumed that even if 
participants saw combination AB and thus knew that the trial was a loss trial, they would still 
update their appraisals according to the last symbol (A/B vs. C) and thus would appraise the 
proximity of the current outcome to the goal-congruent outcome. This assumption was based on 
the famous missed flight example of Kahneman and Tversky (1982). In the example, two men 
arrive at the airport 30 minutes after the scheduled departure time of their respective flights. One 
person is told that his flight left on time and the other person is told that, because of a delay, his 
flight left only five minutes ago. The researchers predicted that although both missed their flight, 
the latter person would feel more upset. This can only be the case if the appraisal process 
continues after the goal-incongruent outcome is definitive. To check whether participants indeed 
updated their appraisals along with the presentation of the second and third symbols, we asked 
them to rate the goal congruence of the two-fruit displays and of the three-fruit displays. Feelings 
and action tendencies were measured in response to the three-fruit displays because only when 
all three symbols were presented, it became clear whether the trial was a win trial vs. an 
unexpected proximal loss trial, or an expected proximal loss trial vs. an expected distal loss trial. 
In other words, only the emotional response locked on the third symbol could be used to 
calculate the effects of interest. 
Experiments 1 and 2 had a similar procedure but with small variations in trial 
distribution. In Experiment 1, participants received an equal number of AAB trials, ABA/ABB 
trials, and ABC trials (see Table 1). This way of counterbalancing has the (statistical) advantage 
that each cell of the design contained an equal number of trials and that the effects of trial type as 
well as the specific effects of expectancy and proximity could be calculated on an equal number 
of trials. A potential drawback of this design, however, was that the total number of unexpected 
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loss trials (AAB) was lower than the total number of expected loss trials (ABA/ABB plus ABC) 
and that the total number of proximal loss trials (AAB plus ABA/ABB) was higher than the total 
number of distal loss trials (ABC). To warrant an interpretation of our effects in terms of 
expectancy and proximity rather than in terms of differences in trial frequency, a different 
counterbalancing procedure was employed in Experiment 2. In this experiment, half of the 
participants received an equal number of unexpected and expected loss trials (i.e., the number of 
AAB trials was equal to the sum of ABA/ABB and ABC trials) whereas the other half received 
an equal number of distal and proximal loss trials (i.e., the number of ABC trials was equal to the 
sum of ABA/ABB and AAB trials). In Experiment 3, we employed the same counterbalancing 




 Thirty-seven students at Ghent University (Mage = 22, 4 males) participated in the 
experiment in return for payment (8 €, augmented with the amount they won in the game). The 
students in this sample had a moderate to high experience with gambling in general (M = 4.92, 
SD = 1.93) but a low experience with slot machines (M = 2.00, SD = 1.27), as was evident from 
their ratings on scales ranging from 1 (completely not experienced) to 7 (very experienced). 
Materials. 
The experiment was programmed and run in Affect 4.0 (Spruyt, Clarysse, 
Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, & Hermans, 2010). It was administered on a computer connected to a 
keyboard, a 19” CRT screen, two speakers, and a mouse-shaped response box (Voss, Leonhart, 
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& Stahl, 2007). Other materials in the room were a transparent money bank and a bag filled with 
ten-cent coins. 
The slot machine presented on the computer screen consisted of three parts (see Figure 
1). The upper part contained the slots in which the fruits appeared. The middle part contained 
three information boxes, from left to right labeled as “credits” (with the number of available 
credits), “bet” (with the number of betted credits on a particular trial), and “winning bet” (the 
number of credits needed to repair a goal-incongruent outcome; this information appeared only 
after a successful bet in the repair game). The lower part contained three spin buttons (in the first 
phase of each trial) or a feedback message (in the second phase of each trial). 
Design. 
The experiment consisted of 9 win trials (AAA), 48 unexpected proximal loss trials 
(AAB), 48 expected proximal loss trials (24 ABA, 24 ABB), and 48 expected distal loss trials 
(ABC; see Table 1).  
Procedure. 
All participants were tested individually in a session of 45 minutes. The participant was 
seated at a table facing the CRT screen, holding the left hand on the numerical part of the 
keyboard and the right hand (index and middle finger) on the response box. The experimenter 
was seated at a table placed orthogonally to the participants’ table and was unable to see the 
computer screen. The money bank was positioned between the participant and the experimenter 
and was visible to both. At the start of the experiment, participants had no money but received 
1200 credits to bet throughout the experiment. 
The experiment consisted of 153 trials presented in a random order in three blocks of 51 
trials. At trial start, the slot machine had three empty slots. Under each slot, there was a button 
 14 
with the word “spin”. When the participant pressed numerical key “1”, the spin button under the 
first slot was activated (indicated by a yellow border that appeared around the button) and the 
slot machine spun the wheel of the first slot for a time interval between 500 and 1500 ms 
(together with the sound of a spinning wheel) until a piece of fruit appeared (together with a 
clicking sound). After the first fruit appeared, the participant could press numerical key “2” to 
activate the spin button under the second slot. After the second fruit appeared, the participant 
could press numerical key “3” to activate the spin button under the third slot. The pictures of 
pieces of fruit that could appear in the slots were a lemon (L), a prune (P), and a melon (M). 
They could appear in one of the following five combinations: AAA, AAB, ABA, ABB, or ABC. 
On each trial, the three pictures were assigned randomly to the function of A, B, and C. The three 
pieces of fruit remained on screen together for 1000 ms before a win feedback message (“10 
cent”, printed in green) or a loss feedback message (“0 cents”, printed in red) appeared in the 
bottom part of the slot machine, replacing the spin buttons. The win feedback was accompanied 
by a positive sound and a deposit of ten cents by the experimenter in the money bank. The loss 
feedback was accompanied by pictures of two red buttons that appeared simultaneously on the 
screen and that were tagged “second chance” (left button) and “pass” (right button). Participants 
could choose a second chance or could pass by clicking the corresponding left or right button of 
the response box. When participants chose to pass, the next trial started 1000 ms later and a 
negative sound was played. When participants chose for a second chance, they could bet a 
number of credits to repair the goal-incongruent outcome. The start bet was ten credits. 
Participants could choose to bet ten or more credits. When the second chance button was clicked 
for the first time, the start bet was made and the pass button turned into a stop button (i.e., the 
word “pass” was replaced by the word “stop”). Each additional click on the second chance 
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button increased the bet by one credit and decreased the available credits by one. When 
participants pressed the stop button, the two buttons disappeared and the computer compared the 
number of betted credits to a random number between zero and fifty. If the bet was equal to or 
exceeded the random number, the win feedback message and the random number were 
displayed, a positive sound was played, and the experimenter made a deposit of ten cents. If the 
bet was lower than the random number, the loss feedback message remained on screen and a 
negative sound was played (the random number was not shown). The feedback remained on 
screen for 3000 ms before a new trial started. 
Prior to the experiment, participants received written and oral instructions, a 
demonstration trial, and a practice trial (both ABC trials). On the demonstration trial, the 
experimenter demonstrated how the participant could repair the negative outcome and explained 
that higher bets yielded a higher chance at winning (a bet of 10 credits was said to correspond to 
a low chance at winning, 15 credits to a slightly higher chance, 25 credits to a chance of 50%, 35 
credits to substantially more than 50% chance, and 50 credits to a 100% chance). The practice 
trial was identical to the experimental trials, except that participants could not win money nor 
lose credits (the number of available credits was reset to 1200 after the practice trial). Before the 
actual experiment, the participant was instructed to use the 1200 credits in a sparing way, more 
specifically, to spend them equally across the three blocks of the experiment (i.e., ±400 credits 
per block). After each block, the game paused and the number of available credits was displayed. 
The experimenter then evaluated whether the participant had followed the instructions and, if 
not, repeated them. 
After the experiment, a questionnaire was administered in which different trial types were 
rated on scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (yes completely). The questionnaire displayed the 
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different trial types in a sequential manner: the two-fruit display LL was followed by the three-
fruit displays LLL and LLM; the two-fruit display LM was followed by the three-fruit displays 
LML and LMP. The two-fruit displays were added as a manipulation check. They allowed us to 
test (a) whether the expectation of winning was higher for LL displays than for LM displays and 
(b) whether participants updated their appraisals (more specifically, the appraisal of goal 
congruence) from the second to the third symbol or whether on some trials (e.g., LM trials) the 
third symbol was ignored. For the two-fruit displays LL and LM, participants rated their 
expectation of winning ten cents (“to what extent do you expect to win 10 cents?”) and their 
appraisal of goal congruence (“to what extent do you think the situation is positive?”). For all 
loss displays (LLM, LML, and LMP), participants rated the appraisal of goal congruence, 
negative feelings (anger, disappointment, and frustration), the tendency to pass, the tendency to 
choose a second chance, the number of credits they wanted to bet in the repair game, and the 
appraisal of coping potential (“when you bet 25 credits in the repair game, to what extent do you 
expect to win back the ten cents in the repair game?”). The latter appraisal was included to 
examine whether any effects of expectancy or proximity were moderated or mediated by coping 
potential. If participants would appraise their coping potential as higher on unexpected proximal 
losses than on expected distal losses, this could explain a higher tendency to repair on the former 
than on the latter trials. The questionnaire was administered in three versions to counterbalance 
the order of appearance of the different trial types: In the first version the order was LL(M), 
LL(L), LM(L), and LM(P); in the second version it was LM(L), LM(P), LL(M), and LL(L); and 
in the third version it was LM(P), LM(L), LL(M), and LL(L). After completion of the 
questionnaire, participants were thanked and debriefed and the money in the money bank was 




For each dependent variable, we first conducted a repeated measures MANOVA with the 
within-subjects variable trial type (unexpected proximal or AAB, expected proximal or 
ABA/ABB, and expected distal or ABC). Second, to investigate the unique effect of expectancy, 
we used planned comparisons to contrast unexpected proximal trials (AAB) with expected 
proximal trials (ABA/ABB). Third, to investigate the unique effect of proximity, we used 
planned comparisons to contrast expected proximal trials (ABA/ABB) with expected distal trials 
(ABC). Fourth, to examine whether the effect of expectancy was significantly different from the 
effect of proximity, we used polynomial contrasts to test for a quadratic trend in the relation 
between AAB, ABA/ABB, and ABC trials. A table of means and standard deviations for these 
analyses is presented in Table 2. Fifth, we inspected the correlations between the effects of 
expectancy on the different dependent variables and similarly for the effects of proximity (see 
Table 3). More specifically, we correlated the difference scores representing the effects of 
expectancy on the various dependent variables with each other, for example, the effect of 
expectancy on the percentage of choosing a second chance (i.e., the difference between the 
percentage of choosing a second chance on AAB minus ABA/ABB trials) with the effect of 
expectancy on ratings of disappointment (i.e., the difference between feelings of disappointment 
on AAB minus ABA/ABB trials). Similarly, we correlated the effects of proximity on the 
various dependent variables with each other. Finally, we investigated whether differences in 
coping potential could explain the effects of expectancy and proximity. It may be noted that we 
did not examine the interaction between expectancy and proximity, because our design did not 
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contain unexpected distal trials. Before turning to the results of these analyses, we report the 
results of a manipulation check.  
Manipulation check. 
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed that participants’ expectation of winning ten 
cents was significantly higher on LL trials (M = 4.41, SD = 1.09) than on LM trials (M = 2.43, 
SD = 1.37), F(1, 36) = 58.28, p < .001, η²p = .62. Moreover, the LL display was rated as more 
goal congruent (M = 5.22, SD = 1.11) than the LM display (M = 3.05, SD = 2.05), F(1, 36) = 
35.18, p < .001 η²p = .49.  
To test whether participants updated their appraisals from the second to the third symbol 
on LM trials (despite knowing that the trial would be a loss trial), we compared the appraisal of 
goal congruence on (a) the LML vs. LMP displays, (b) the LM vs. LML displays, and (c) the LM 
vs. LMP displays. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed that LML trials were rated as 
significantly more goal congruent (M = 3.27, SD = 1.72) than LMP trials (M = 2.30, SD = 1.73), 
F(1, 36) = 7.08, p = .012, η²p = .16. Further analyses showed that the appraisal of goal 
congruence decreased marginally from LM displays to LMP displays (M = 2.62, SD = 1.83), 
F(1, 36) = 4.08, p = .051, η²p =.10, and did not change from LM displays (M = 3.05, SD = 2.05) 
to LML displays (M = 3.24, SD = 2.83), F(1, 36) = 0.83, p = .37, η²p = .022.  
Influence of expectancy and proximity on the tendency to repair. 
The tendency to repair was measured via repair behavior (online) and via self-reports (at 
the end of the experiment). We discuss the results for each measure as well as the correlations 
between the measures. 
Behavioral measures. We analyzed two aspects of repair behavior: (a) the percentage of 
choosing for a second chance and (b) the average bet placed after choosing for a second chance. 
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The analysis of the percentage of choosing a second chance revealed a significant effect of trial 
type, F(2, 35) = 7.07, p = .003, η²p = .29. Choosing a second chance was both influenced by 
expectancy (i.e., participants more often chose a second chance on unexpected proximal or AAB 
trials than on expected proximal or ABA/ABB trials), F(1, 36) = 6.37, p = .016, η²p = .15, and by 
proximity (i.e., participants more often chose a second chance on expected proximal or 
ABA/ABB trials than on expected distal or ABC trials), F(1, 36) = 8.48, p = .006, η²p = .19 (see 
Table 2). The effect of proximity was not significantly different from the effect of expectancy, 
F(1, 36) = 1.93, p = .17, η²p = .051 (see Table 2).  
The analysis of the average bet after choosing for a second chance revealed a trend effect 
of trial type, F(2, 32) = 2.61, p = .089, η²p = .14. There was a trend effect of expectancy (i.e., the 
average bet was higher on unexpected proximal or AAB trials than on expected proximal or 
ABA/ABB trials), F(1, 33) = 3.28, p = .079, η²p  = .090. The effect of proximity was not 
significant, F(1, 33) = 1.03, p = .75, η²p  = .003. There was no significant difference between the 
influence of expectancy and proximity, F(1,33) = 0.45, p = .51, η²p  = .013 (see Table 2). 
Self-reports. Three items of the questionnaire reflected the tendency to repair: (a) the 
tendency to choose a second chance, (b) the tendency to pass, and (c) the number of betted 
credits. The self-reported tendency to choose a second chance was significantly influenced by 
trial type, F(2, 35) = 7.10, p = .003, η²p = .29. There was a significant effect of expectancy (i.e., 
participants reported a stronger tendency to choose a second chance on unexpected proximal or 
AAB trials than on expected proximal or ABA trials), F(1, 36) = 6.61, p = .014, η²p = .16, a trend 
effect of proximity (i.e., participants reported a stronger tendency to choose a second chance on 
expected proximal or ABA trials than on expected distal or ABC trials), F(1, 36) = 3.56, p = 
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.067, η²p = .09, and no difference between the two effects, F(1, 36) = .047, p = .83, η²p = .001 
(see Table 2). 
For the tendency to pass, there was again a significant effect of trial type, F(2, 35) = 4.24, 
p = .022, η²p = .20. The effect of expectancy failed to reach significance, F(1, 36) = 2.21, p = .15, 
η²p = .058, but the effect of proximity again reached significance (i.e., the tendency to pass was 
lower on expected proximal ABA or trials than on expected distal or ABC trials), F(1, 36) = 
4.58, p = .039, η²p = .11. There was no difference between the two effects, F(1, 36) = 0.40, p = 
.53, η²p = .11 (see Table 2).  
For the number of betted credits, there was no global effect of trial type, F(2, 35) = 3.74, 
p = .34, η²p = .18. Nevertheless, the effect of expectancy was significant (i.e., self-reported bets 
were higher on unexpected proximal or AAB trials than on expected proximal or ABA trials), 
F(1, 36) = 5.71, p = .022, η²p = .14. The effect of proximity was not significant, F(1, 36) = 1.14, 
p = .29, η²p = .03, but did not differ significantly from the effect of expectancy, F(1, 36) = .075, p 
= .79, η²p = .002 (see Table 2). 
Correlations. Both for the effects of expectancy and proximity, we examined the 
correlations (a) among the effects obtained with the two behavioral measures of the tendency to 
repair, (b) among the effects obtained with the three self-report measures of the tendency to 
repair, and (c) between the effects obtained with both types of measures. For the effects of 
expectancy, only two correlations reached significance: The effect of expectancy on the self-
reported tendency to pass correlated negatively with the effect of expectancy on the self-reported 
tendency to choose a second chance and negatively with the effect of expectancy on the self-
reported bet (see Table 3). 
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For the effects of proximity the data pattern was slightly different. The correlation among 
the behavioral measures again did not reach significance, but all correlations among the self-
report measures were significant (see Table 3). Additionally, there were significant correlations 
between the effects of proximity on the tendency to repair as measured by behavior and as 
measured by self-reports: The effect of proximity on all three self-report scales correlated 
significantly with the effect of proximity on the percentage of choosing a second chance, and the 
effect of proximity on the self-reported bet correlated with the effect of proximity on the actual 
bet (see Table 3). 
Influence of expectancy and proximity on negative feelings. 
We examined the influence of expectancy and proximity on the self-reported feelings of 
disappointment, frustration, and anger. For disappointment, we found a significant effect of trial 
type, F(2, 35) = 11.96, p < .001, η²p = .41. As can be seen in Table 2, the effect of expectancy 
was significant (i.e., participants felt more disappointment on unexpected proximal or AAB trials 
than on expected proximal or ABA trials), F(1, 36) = 20.54, p < .001, η²p = .36, but the effect of 
proximity failed to reach significance, F(1, 36) = 0.31, p = .58, η²p =.009. The effect of 
expectancy was significantly stronger than the effect of proximity, F(1, 36) = 6.45, p = .016, η²p 
= .15. 
A similar pattern of results emerged for frustration: There was a significant effect of trial 
type, F(2, 35) = 8.12, p = .001, η²p = .317, a significant effect of expectancy (i.e., participants felt 
more frustration on unexpected proximal or AAB trials than on expected proximal or ABA 
trials), F(1, 36) = 11.24, p = .002, η²p = .24, and no effect of proximity, F(1, 36) = 2.57, p = .12, 
η²p = .067. The difference between the two was marginally significant, F(1, 36) = 3.02, p = .091, 
η²p = .077 (see Table 2). 
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For anger there was also a significant effect of trial type, F(2, 35) = 9.05, p = .001, η²p = 
.34. The effect of expectancy was significant (i.e., participants felt more anger on unexpected 
proximal or AAB trials than on expected proximal or ABA trials), F(1, 36) = 18.59, p < .001, η²p 
= .34, and the effect of proximity was not, F(1, 36) = 0.00. The effect of proximity differed 
significantly from the effect of expectancy, F(1, 36) = 8.40, p = .006, η²p = .19 (see Table 2). 
Both for the effects of expectancy and proximity, we examined the correlations among 
the different negative feelings as well as between these feelings and the tendency to repair. The 
effects of expectancy on disappointment, frustration, and anger were highly interrelated (see 
Table 3). The same held for the effects of proximity on anger and frustration and the effects of 
proximity on anger and disappointment. There were no significant correlations between feelings 
and the tendency to repair (neither for the effects of expectancy, nor for the effects of proximity, 
Table 3). 
Role of coping potential.  
We investigated whether differences in the appraisal of coping potential moderated or 
mediated the effects of the appraisals of expectancy and proximity on the tendency to repair and 
on negative feelings. First, we investigated whether expectancy or proximity had an influence on 
coping potential. Coping potential differed significantly across the trial types, F(2, 35) = 3.47, p 
= .042, η²p = .17. There was a significant effect of expectancy: Participants rated their coping 
potential as higher on unexpected proximal or AAB trials (M = 4.49, SD = 1.04) than on 
expected proximal or ABA trials (M = 4.16, SD = 1.01), F(1, 36) = 6.34, p = .016, η²p = .15. 
There was no effect of proximity: Coping potential was rated as equally high on expected 
proximal or ABA trials (M = 4.16, SD = 1.01) and on expected distal or ABC trials (M = 4.22, 
SD = 1.03), F < 1. To examine whether the effect of expectancy on any of the dependent 
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variables was mediated, moderated, or unaffected by coping potential, we regressed the 
difference between AAB trials and ABA trials for each dependent variable on two predictors: (a) 
the centered sum score of coping potential on AAB trials and ABA trials and (b) the difference 
score in coping potential on AAB trials and ABA trials (Judd, Kenny, & McClelland, 2001). The 
interpretation of this analysis is as follows (Judd, et al., 2001): (a) If the difference score of the 
dependent variable is significantly predicted by the centered sum score of coping potential, then 
coping potential moderates the effect of expectancy; (b) if the difference score of the dependent 
variable is significantly predicted by the difference score of coping potential, then coping 
potential mediates the effect of expectancy; (c) if the intercept is significant, the residual effect of 
expectancy is significant over and above the difference in coping potential. We executed eight 
regressions for each of the difference scores of the dependent variables (disappointment, 
frustration, anger, frequency of choosing a second chance, average bet, self-reported bet, self-
reported tendency to choose a second chance, and self-reported tendency to pass). For none of 
the eight variables we found support for a moderation effect, ts < 1. We did find support for a 
mediation effect for two dependent variables: the self-reported bet, β = .39, t(36) = 2.46, p = 
.019, and the self-reported tendency to choose a second chance, β = .34, t(36) = 2.08, p = .045. 
The positive regression weights indicate that the more participants estimated their coping 
potential as higher on AAB trials than on ABA trials, the more their self-reported tendency to 
repair was increased on AAB trials compared to ABA trials. There was no residual effect of 
expectancy for the self-reported bet, t(36) = 1.39 p = .18, nor for the self-reported tendency to 
choose a second chance, t(36) = 1.64, p = .11, suggesting full mediation. The effects of none of 
the other variables were mediated by coping potential, ts < 1. 
Discussion 
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The results of the first experiment suggest that the appraisals of expectancy and 
proximity both influence emotional responding to goal-incongruent events. Expectancy and 
proximity separately augmented the tendency to repair: Both variables affected the decision to 
engage in repair behavior (i.e., to take a second chance) and expectancy additionally had a 
marginal effect on the number of credits that were invested subsequently. Data on the self-
reported tendency to repair largely confirmed this pattern. The absence of correlations between 
the tendency to repair as measured by self-reports and as measured by behavior may indicate that 
participants’ behavior was influenced by additional factors that did not influence self-reported 
action tendencies (such as strategic influences) or that participants did not (or could not) 
accurately report on their action tendencies. 
A different pattern of results emerged for feelings of disappointment, frustration, and 
anger. All feelings remained largely unaffected by proximity but were significantly increased by 
expectancy. Additional analyses suggested that most of our results could not be attributed to 
differences in coping potential, except in the case of an influence of expectancy on the self-
reported tendency to repair: Participants appraised their coping potential to be higher on 
unexpected than on expected loss trials and this difference mediated the effects of expectancy on 
the self-reported tendency to repair. 
To ascertain that our results generalized across different trial distributions, we conducted 
a second experiment in which trial distribution was directly manipulated. In Experiment 1, the 
amount of unexpected proximal loss or AAB trials, expected proximal loss or ABA/ABB trials, 
and expected distal loss or ABC trials was balanced (i.e., each trial type occurred 48 times). This 
way of counterbalancing implied, however, that the frequency of expected loss trials (i.e., 
ABA/ABB plus ABC trials, 96 trials in total) was higher than the frequency of unexpected loss 
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trials (i.e., AAB trials, 48 in total) and that the frequency of proximal loss trials (i.e., ABA/ABB 
plus AAB trials, 96 trials in total) was higher than the frequency of distal loss trials (i.e., ABC 
trials, 48 in total, see Table 1). This leaves open a number of alternative explanations for the 
findings of Experiment 1. For example, the finding that only expectancy influenced feelings of 
disappointment, frustration, and anger could be explained by the fact that the amount of 
unexpected loss trials was relatively low (i.e., 48 trials) compared to the amount of proximal 
trials (i.e., 96 trials). Mere exposure to frequent events (e.g., trials starting with AB) may have 
diminished negative feelings to those events compared to infrequent ones (e.g., trials starting 
with AA). In other words, this finding could reflect a habituation effect instead of an effect of 
expectancy. In Experiment 2, we employed two new manipulations of trial distribution. In a first 
condition, we matched the number of expected and unexpected loss trials. In a second condition, 
we matched the number of proximal and distal loss trials. Replication of the effects of 
Experiment 1 across the different trial distributions would allow us to safely conclude that the 
obtained effects were a function of the manipulations of expectancy and proximity rather than of 




Thirty first-year psychology students at Ghent University (Mage = 19, 8 males) 
participated in the experiment in return for course credits. As in Experiment 1, the students had a 
moderate to high experience with gambling in general (M = 5.00, SD = 1.74) but a low 
experience with slot machines (M = 2.00, SD = 1.20). 
Design. 
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The experiment consisted of two between-subjects conditions (see Table 1): The first 
condition had 72 unexpected proximal loss trials (AAB), 36 expected proximal loss trials (18 
ABA trials, 18 ABB trials), and 36 expected distal loss trials (ABC). The second condition had 
36 unexpected proximal loss trials (AAB), 36 expected proximal loss trials (18 ABA trials, 18 
ABB trials), and 72 expected distal loss trials (ABC). In all conditions, participants received 9 
win trials (AAA trials). For ease of communication, in the remainder of the text we refer to these 
two conditions as the 72-AAB/36-ABC condition and the 36-AAB/72-ABC condition 
respectively.  
Procedure. 
The procedure was identical to the procedure of Experiment 1, except that the item for 
coping potential was not included in the questionnaire. 
Results 
Analyses.  
The analyses of Experiment 2 were identical to the analyses of Experiment 1, except that 
the between-subjects factor trial distribution was added to the repeated measures MANOVA. 
Manipulation check. 
A Trial Type (LL vs. LM) x Trial Distribution analysis for the ratings of the expectation 
to win ten cents revealed a main effect of trial type, F(1, 28) = 33.69, p < .001, η²p = .55, no main 
effect of trial distribution, nor an interaction between trial type and trial distribution, Fs < 1. 
Participants had a higher expectation of winning ten cents on LL trials (M = 4.47, SD = 1.25) 
than on LM trials (M = 2.27, SD = 1.36). Additionally, a Trial Type (LL vs. LM) x Trial 
Distribution analysis for the ratings of goal congruence suggested that the LL display was rated 
as more positive (M = 5.31, SD = 1.34) than the LM display (M = 2.62, SD = 1.78), F(1, 28) = 
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42.50, p < .001, η²p =.60. There was no influence of trial distribution on the ratings of goal 
congruence, Fs < 1. 
An analysis of Trial Type (LML vs. LMP) x Trial Distribution for the ratings of goal 
congruence revealed a main effect of trial type,  F(1, 28) = 10.05, p = .004, η²p = .26. This 
suggests that participants did not ignore the third and last symbol on LM trials. Conform the 
pattern of results in Experiment 1, LML trials were rated as more goal congruent (M = 3.24, SD 
= 1.83) than LMP trials (M = 2.62, SD = 1.83). There was no main effect of trial distribution nor 
an interaction between trial type and trial distribution,  Fs < 1.06, ps > .31. Further analyses 
revealed that the appraisal of goal congruence increased significantly from LM (M = 2.60, SD = 
1.75) to LML (M = 3.27, SD = 1.72), F(1, 28) = 5.82, p = .023, η²p = .17, and did not change 
from LM to LMP (M = 2.30, SD = 1.73), F(1, 28) = 2.42, p = .14 η²p = .08. 
Influence of expectancy and proximity on the tendency to repair. 
The tendency to repair was measured via repair behavior (online) and via self-reports (at 
the end of the experiment). We discuss the results for each measure in turn. 
Behavioral measures. We analyzed two aspects of repair behavior across the different 
trial types: (a) the percentage of choosing for a second chance and (b) the average bet placed 
after choosing for a second chance. The Trial Type x Trial Distribution analysis for the 
percentage of choosing a second chance revealed a main effect of trial type, F(2, 27) = 10.18, p = 
.001, η²p = .43, a main effect of trial distribution, F(1, 28) = 6.98, p = .013, η²p = .20, and no 
interaction between trial type and trial distribution, F(2, 27) = 0.93, p = .41, η²p = .065. Choosing 
a second chance was marginally influenced by expectancy (i.e., participants more often chose a 
second chance on unexpected proximal or AAB trials than on expected proximal or ABA/ABB 
trials), F(1, 28) = 3.59, p = .069, η²p = .11, and was significantly influenced by proximity (i.e., 
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participants more often chose a second chance on expected proximal or ABA/ABB trials than on 
expected distal or ABC trials), F(1, 28) = 18.57, p < .001, η²p = .40 (see Table 2). The influence 
of proximity was significantly stronger than the influence of expectancy, F(1, 28) = 5.30, p = 
.029, η²p = .16. (see Table 2). The main effect of trial distribution suggested that participants in 
the 36-AAB/72-ABC condition more often chose for a second chance (M = 46.14%, SD = 11.27) 
than participants in the 72-AAB/36-ABC condition (M = 36.20%, SD = 9.24). 
The Trial Type x Trial Distribution analysis for the average bet after choosing for a 
second chance yielded no main effect of trial type, F(2, 26) = 0.55, p = .58, η²p = .041, nor of 
trial distribution, F(2, 26) = 1.45, p = .24, η²p = .051, and no interaction between trial type and 
trial distribution, F(2, 26) = 0.67, p = .52, η²p = .049. There was no effect of expectancy, F(1, 27) 
= 0.73, p = .40, η²p  = .026, no effect of proximity, F(1, 27) = 0.20, p = .66, η²p = .007, and no 
difference between the effects of proximity and expectancy, F(1, 27) < 0.01, p = .98 (see Table 
2). 
Self-reports. We discuss the results for the three items of the questionnaire that reflected 
the tendency to repair: (a) the tendency to choose a second chance, (b) the tendency to pass, and 
(c) the number of betted credits. The Trial Type x Trial Distribution analysis for the self-reported 
tendency to choose a second chance revealed a main effect of trial type, F(2, 27) = 5.42, p = 
.010, η²p = .29, a marginal main effect of trial distribution, F(1, 28) = 3.84, p = .06, η²p = .12, and 
no interaction between trial type and trial distribution, F(2, 27) = 1.23, p = .31, η²p = .084. There 
was a significant effect of expectancy (i.e., a stronger tendency to choose a second chance on 
unexpected proximal or AAB trials than on expected proximal or ABA trials), F(1, 28) = 4.57, p 
= .041, η²p = .14, a significant effect of proximity (i.e., a stronger tendency to choose a second 
chance on expected proximal or ABA trials than on expected distal or ABC trials), F(1, 28) = 
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6.01, p = .021, η²p = .18, and no difference between the two effects, F(1, 28) = 1.08, p = .31, η²p 
= .037 (see Table 2). The marginal effect of trial distribution suggested that participants in the 
36-AAB/72-ABC condition reported a higher tendency to choose a second chance (M = 4.69, SD 
= 0.96) those in the 72-AAB/36-ABC condition (M = 3.96, SD = 1.09). 
For the tendency to pass, there was a significant effect of trial type, F(2, 27) = 5.61, p = 
.009, η²p = .29, a trend effect of trial distribution, F(1, 28) = 3.91, p = .058, η²p = .12, and no 
interaction between trial type and trial distribution, F(2, 27) = 2.21, p = .13, η²p = .14. We again 
observed an effect of expectancy (i.e., a lower tendency to pass on unexpected proximal or AAB 
trials than on expected proximal or ABA trials), F(1, 28) = 4.23, p = .049, η²p = .13, an effect of 
proximity (i.e., a lower tendency to pass on expected proximal or ABA trials than on expected 
distal or ABC trials), F(1, 28) = 4.75, p = .038, η²p = .15, and no difference between the two 
effects, F(1, 28) = 0.02, p = .88, η²p =  .001 (see Table 2). The trend effect of trial distribution 
suggests that participants in the 72-AAB/36-ABC condition reported a higher tendency to pass 
(M = 4.24, SD = 1.08) than those in the 36-AAB/72-ABC condition (M = 3.47, SD = 1.08). 
For the number of betted credits, there was no main effect of trial type, F(2, 27) = 2.43, p 
= .11, η²p = .15, no main effect of trial distribution, F(1, 28) = 0.09, p = .97, η²p < .001, and no 
interaction between trial type and trial distribution, F(2, 27) = 0.55, p = .58, η²p = .039. There 
was a trend effect of expectancy (i.e., higher bets on unexpected proximal or AAB than on 
expected proximal or ABA trials), F(1, 28) = 2.94, p = .097, η²p = .095. The effect of proximity 
was not significant, F(1, 28) = 0.75, p = .39, η²p = .026, but was also not significantly different 
from the effect of expectancy, F(1, 28) = 0.11, p = .74, η²p =  .004 (see Table 2). 
Correlations. Both for the effects of expectancy and proximity, we examined the 
correlations (a) among the effects on the two behavioral measures, (b) among the effects on the 
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three self-report measures of the tendency to repair, and (c) between the effects on both types of 
measures. For the effects of expectancy, similar to Experiment 1, we observed significant 
correlations among a subset of the self-report measures but not among the behavioral measures 
(see Table 3). Unlike in Experiment 1, however, we did observe significant correlations between 
subsets of the self-report and behavioral measures: The effect of expectancy on the percentage of 
choosing a second chance was correlated with the effect of expectancy on the self-reported 
tendency to choose a second chance and with the effect of expectancy on the self-reported 
tendency to pass.  
For the effects of proximity, the pattern of correlations was largely comparable to 
Experiment 1: There was no correlation among the behavioral measures, but all correlations 
among the self-report measures reached significance. Conform to Experiment 1, there were also 
several significant correlations between the effects of proximity on behavioral and self-report 
measures of the tendency to repair (see Table 3).  
Influence of expectancy and proximity on negative feelings. 
We examined the influence of expectancy and proximity on the feelings of 
disappointment, frustration, and anger. For disappointment, we found a significant effect of trial 
type, F(2, 27) = 9.19, p = .001, η²p = .41, no effect of trial distribution, F(1, 28) = 0.19, p = .66, 
η²p = .007, and no interaction between trial type and trial distribution, F(2, 27) = 0.49, p = .62, 
η²p = .035. As can be seen in Table 2, the effect of expectancy was significant (i.e., participants 
felt more disappointment on unexpected proximal or AAB trials than on expected proximal or 
ABA trials), F(1, 28) = 14.99, p = .001, η²p = .35. The effect of proximity failed to reach 
significance, F(1, 28) = 0.10, p = .75, η²p = .004. The effect of expectancy was marginally 
stronger than the effect of proximity, F(1, 28) = 3.82, p = .061, η²p = .12. 
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For frustration, there was no effect of trial type, F(2, 26) = 0.49, p = .62, η²p = .036, nor 
of trial distribution, F(1, 27) = 0.77, p = .39, η²p = .028, and no interaction between trial type and 
trial distribution, F(2, 26) = 1.52, p = .24, η²p = .10. The effect of expectancy was not significant, 
F(1, 27) = 0.95, p = .34, η²p = .034, nor was the effect of proximity, F(1, 27) = 0.16, p = .69, η²p 
= .006. There was no difference between the effects of expectancy and proximity, F(1, 27) = 
0.52, p = .48., η²p = .019 (see Table 2). 
The pattern for anger was more complicated. There was no effect of trial type, F(2, 27) = 
0.22, p = .81, η²p = .016, nor of trial distribution, F(1, 28) = 0.66, p = .41, η²p = .023, but there 
was a marginally significant interaction between trial type and trial distribution, F(2, 27) = 3.27, 
p = .054, η²p = .20. In the 36-AAB/72-ABC condition there was a marginal effect of trial type, 
F(2, 13) = 3.76, p = .051, η²p = .37. The effect of expectancy was also marginally significant: 
Participants felt more anger on unexpected proximal or AAB trials (M = 2.33, SD = 1.23) than 
on expected proximal or ABA trials (M = 2.00, SD = 1.07), F(1, 14) = 4.38, p = .055, η²p = .24. 
The effect of proximity was significant but in the other direction than we expected: Participants 
felt less anger when the loss was proximal to a win (i.e., on expected proximal or ABA trials; M 
= 2.00, SD = 1.07) than when the loss was distal to a win (i.e., on expected distal or ABC trials; 
M = 2.27, SD = 1.10), F(1, 14) = 5.09, p = .041, η²p = .27. The effect of proximity differed 
significantly from the effect of expectancy, F(1, 14) = 7.88, p = .014, η²p = .36. In the 72-
AAB/36-ABC condition, there was no effect of trial type, F(2, 13) = 1.23, p = .33, η²p = .16. 
There was no effect of expectancy: Participants were equally angry on unexpected proximal or 
AAB trials (M = 1.73, SD = 0.88) and on expected proximal or ABA trials (M = 2.07, SD = 
1.03), F(1, 14) = 2.50, p = .14, η²p = .15. There was also no effect of proximity: Participants were 
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equally angry on expected proximal or ABA trials (M = 2.07, SD = 1.03) and on expected distal 
or ABC trials (M = 1.93, SD = 0.96), F(1, 14) = 0.48, p = .50, η²p = .033. 
Contrary to the high correlations in Experiment 1, there were no correlations between the 
effects of expectancy on anger, disappointment, and frustration (see Table 3). For proximity, the 
only correlation that reached significance was a negative correlation between the effect of 
proximity on anger and the effect of proximity on frustration. Confirming the pattern of 
Experiment 1, few significant correlations were observed between the effects of expectancy and 
proximity on the tendency to repair, on the one hand, and the effects of expectancy and 
proximity on negative feelings, on the other hand. Exceptions were (a) a marginal negative 
relation between the effects of expectancy/proximity on disappointment and the effects of 
expectancy/proximity on the amount of betted credits, and (b) a significant positive relation 
between the effect of expectancy on the self-reported tendency to choose a second chance and 
the effect of expectancy on disappointment. 
Discussion 
Most of the findings of Experiment 1 were confirmed across the two new trial 
distributions introduced in Experiment 2. Trial distribution did not interact with any of the 
effects of expectancy and proximity on the dependent measures, except when angry feelings 
were considered. Trial distribution did have a global motivational effect, however. Participants in 
the condition with the least (36) unexpected proximal loss or AAB trials and the most (72) 
expected distal loss or ABC trials were more inclined to repair the goal-incongruent outcomes 
than participants in the condition with the most (72) unexpected proximal loss or AAB trials and 
the least (36) expected distal loss or ABC trials. This data pattern confirms previous findings that 
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participants especially persist in gambling in face of moderate (instead of high) amounts of near-
misses (Kassinove & Schare, 2001).  
Most importantly, the majority of the findings of Experiment 1 were replicated in 
Experiment 2, which confirms that these findings were robust across variations in trial 
distribution. We again observed that both expectancy and proximity influenced the tendency to 
repair as measured by behavior (i.e., to choose a second chance) and self-reports. We also 
replicated the result that unexpected losses led to more disappointment than expected losses, but 
that feelings of disappointment were unaffected by the appraisal of proximity.  Different from 
Experiment 1, however, this result did not replicate for feelings of anger and frustration. The 
effect of expectancy on anger seemed to be dependent on the specific distribution of the trials: 
Feelings of anger were marginally increased on AAB trials compared to ABA trials for 
participants who received a low amount of AAB trials and a high amount of ABC trials (the 36-
AAB/72-ABC condition) but not for participants who received a high amount of AAB trials and 
a low amount of ABC trials (the 72-AAB/36-ABC condition). It may be noted that participants’ 
expectation of winning ten cents on AA trials was equally high in both conditions. A possible 
explanation for this pattern of findings is that when expectations are frequently disconfirmed (in 
the 72-AAB/36-ABC condition), feelings of anger following unexpected events are attenuated.  
In Experiment 3, we further examined the effects of expectancy and proximity on 
feelings of disappointment, frustration, and anger. Experiments 1 and 2 suggested that the feeling 
component was influenced only by the appraisal of expectancy, whereas the motivational 
component (i.e., the tendency to repair) was influenced by both the appraisals of expectancy and 
of proximity. Importantly, however, the feeling component was measured retrospectively 
whereas the motivational component was measured both retrospectively and trial by trial. The 
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observed differences between the feeling and motivational component thus could be an artifact 
of our measurement method. In Experiment 3, we investigated whether the observation that 
negative feelings are influenced by the appraisal of expectancy and not by the appraisal of 






Thirty-four participants (Mage = 23, 6 men) took part in the study in return for payment 
(10 €, augmented with the amount they won in the game). Twenty-nine participants were 
students of which fourteen studied psychology; two participants were phd students of Ghent 
University (both faculty of medicine and health sciences), and three participants were employed 
elsewhere. 
Procedure. 
The procedure was similar to the procedure of Experiment 1 (using the same design with 
a balanced number of AAB, ABA/ABB, and ABC trials) with the following changes. First, we 
instructed participants that on some trials we would measure their feelings with regard to the slot 
machine outcome. We also demonstrated the nature of measurement before the start of the 
experiment. On a subset of trials, 2000 ms after a goal-incongruent outcome (0 cent) was 
presented, a visual analog scale appeared below the slot machine, ranging from not at all to yes 
completely, together with one of the following labels: the Dutch words for disappointment 
(teleurstelling), frustration (frustratie), and anger (kwaadheid). Participants were asked to 
indicate the degree to which they experienced these feelings by clicking at a position on the scale 
and pressing ENTER. After the participant had responded, the second chance and pass buttons 
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appeared. The data from the visual analog scale ranged from 0 to 100. Second, participants could 
choose for a second chance or pass using two keys of the keyboard (respectively 7 and 9) instead 
of using the mouse-shaped response box (Voss, et al., 2007). This was done to avoid confusion 
with the mouse responses used to collect online self-reported feelings in this experiment.  
Third, we reduced the total number of credits that participants could bet throughout the 
game. This allowed us to measure feelings of disappointment, frustration, and anger in exactly 
the same circumstances on AAB, ABA/ABB, and ABC trials. Experiments 1 and 2 suggested 
that participants’ tendency to repair goal-incongruent outcomes was stronger on AAB trials than 
on ABA/ABB trials and stronger on ABA/ABB trials than on ABC trials. Hence, if we would 
obtain differences in feelings between the different trial types, it could be a direct effect of 
expectancy and proximity, but also of anticipating or not anticipating a repair action (e.g., 
negative feelings may be attenuated when anticipating a repair action). By reducing the number 
of credits to a hundred, we reduced the number of trials in which a repair action was possible. 
With a total of a hundred credits, participants could place five bets with twenty credits, which 
was the average bet in Experiments 1 and 2, or a maximum of ten bets with ten credits (which 
was the minimum bet). Hence, we anticipated that we would obtain a sufficient number of AAB 
trials, ABA/ABB trials, and ABC trials on which participants did not repair and therefore did not 
anticipate a repair action. This enabled us to eliminate any impact of the anticipation of a repair 
action by conducting all analyses on the set of AAB, ABA/ABB, and ABC trials on which 
participants did not anticipate a repair action. 
Fourth, we took a number of additional measures to keep participants motivated to play 
the game despite the reduction in repair opportunities. First, to compensate for the decrease in 
profit due to the reduced repair opportunity, we rewarded participants with 20 cents instead of 10 
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cents. Second, we reduced the total number of trials from three blocks of 51 trials to one block of 
51 trials, with ten measurement trials for each feeling (disappointment, frustration and anger): 
three AAB trials, three ABC trials, and four ABA/ABB trials (two ABA and two ABB trials). In 
Experiments 1 and 2, the tendency to repair was repeatedly measured on a large number (144) of 
goal-incongruent trials, because we anticipated that complex strategies and changes in those 
strategies may cause noise that may overshadow the effects of expectancy and proximity. 
However, such a high number of trials on which the game is interrupted for the assessment of 
feelings results in a very lengthy procedure that is likely to be very tedious. Hence we decided to 
reduce the number of trials. 
Results 
The analyses were similar to the analyses of Experiment 1 with two exceptions. First, in 
Experiments 1 and 2 there was one (retrospective) data point for each combination of feeling 
(disappointment, frustration, and anger) and trial type (AAB, ABA/ABB, and ABC). In 
Experiment 3, we collected multiple (online) data points for feelings of disappointment, 
frustration, and anger on the different trial types. Hence these data points were first averaged 
across feeling (disappointment, frustration, and anger) and trial type (AAB, ABA/ABB, and 
ABC) before they were entered in the repeated measures MANOVA’s. Second, the trial-by-trial 
assessment of feelings allowed us to control for a potential confounding factor, anticipation of a 
repair action, by performing two analyses for each dependent variable: one analysis including all 
trials (also those on which participants repaired after rating their feelings) and one analysis 
excluding trials on which participants repaired after rating their feelings (12.65% of the trials). 
Despite the restricted possibility to repair goal-incongruent outcomes in Experiment 3, trial type 
did influence whether participants took a second chance, F(2, 32) = 4.67, p = .017, η²p = .23 (but 
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not the number of betted credits, F < 1; MAAB = 16.91, SD = 5.21; MABA/ABB = 17.27, SD = 5.11; 
MABC = 17.35, SD = 5.40). The effect of expectancy on taking a second chance failed to reach 
significance, F(1, 33) = 1.06, p = .55, η²p = .017. Participants took a second chance equally often 
on unexpected proximal or AAB trials (M = 13.42%, SD = 6.55) and on expected proximal or 
ABA/ABB trials (M = 12.32%, SD = 6.96). However, the effect of proximity again reached 
significance, F(1, 33) = 16.94, p = .008, η²p = .19, suggesting that participants more often took a 
second chance on expected proximal or ABA/ABB trials (M = 12.32%, SD = 6.96) than on 
expected distal or ABC trials (M = 7.90%, SD = 6.40). Thus, in Experiments 1 and 2 we found 
both an influence of proximity and expectancy on the tendency to repair, but in Experiment 3, in 
which the opportunity to repair was severely restricted, we only found an effect of proximity on 
the tendency to repair. 
The results of all analyses are presented in Table 4. This table shows that the difference 
between the analyses on the full trial set (including repair trials) vs. the trimmed trial set 
(excluding repair trials) was negligible. Hence, we will only describe the results of the trimmed 
analyses in the text and refer the reader to Table 4 for the results of the full analyses. 
For feelings of disappointment, we obtained a strong effect of trial type, F(2, 32) = 9.89, 
p < .001, η²p = .38. The effect of expectancy was significant (i.e., participants felt more 
disappointment on unexpected proximal or AAB trials than on expected proximal or ABA/ABB 
trials), F(1, 33) = 20.38, p < .001, η²p = .38. The effect of proximity failed to reach significance, 
F(1, 33) = 0.12, p = .73, η²p = .004. The effect of expectancy was significantly stronger than the 
effect of proximity, F(1, 33) = 10.96, p = .002, η²p = .25. 
For feelings of frustration, we obtained a significant effect of trial type, F(2, 32) = 4.24, p 
= .023, η²p = .21. The effect of expectancy was significant (i.e., participants felt more frustration 
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on unexpected proximal or AAB trials than on expected proximal or ABA/ABB trials), F(1, 33) 
=8.45, p = .006, η²p = .20. The effect of proximity failed to reach significance, F(1, 33) = 0.29, p 
= .60, η²p = .009. The effect of expectancy was not significantly stronger than the effect of 
proximity, F(1, 33) = 2.29, p = .14, η²p = .065. 
For feelings of anger, we obtained a significant effect of trial type, F(2, 32) = 4.46, p = 
.020, η²p = .22. As can be seen in Table 4, the effect of expectancy was significant (i.e., 
participants felt more anger on unexpected proximal or AAB trials than on expected proximal or 
ABA/ABB trials), F(1, 33) = 9.17, p = .005, η²p = .22. The effect of proximity failed to reach 
significance, F(1, 33) = 0.10, p = .75, η²p = .003. The effect of expectancy was significantly 
stronger than the effect of proximity, F(1, 33) = 4.80, p = .036, η²p = .13. 
We calculated the correlations between the effects of expectancy on the different negative 
feelings as well as the effects of proximity on the different negative feelings. The effects of 
expectancy on disappointment, frustration, and anger were unrelated, except for two marginally 
positive correlations between anger and disappointment and anger and frustration that failed to 
generalize across trial set (full vs. trimmed). Contrary to the effects of expectancy, the effects of 
proximity on disappointment, frustration, and anger were interrelated (see Table 4). 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 provides further support for the conclusion that feelings of disappointment, 
frustration, and anger are unaffected by the appraisal of proximity but are significantly 
influenced by the appraisal of expectancy. More in particular, we again observed that unexpected 
goal-incongruent events elicited stronger feelings of disappointment, frustration, and anger than 
expected goal-incongruent events. We discarded the alternative hypothesis that a confounding 
factor (the anticipation of a repair action) explained the differences between the trial types by 
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conducting our analyses on a trial set that was limited to those trials in which participants did not 
repair (and hence did not anticipate a repair action). It may be noted that the effect size of the 
effect of expectancy on feelings of disappointment was much larger than of the effect of 
expectancy on feelings of frustration and anger, and that this difference was more pronounced in 
the trial-by-trial assessment of feelings of Experiment 3 than in the retrospective assessment of 
Experiment 1. In addition, we observed that despite the severe restriction on the number of times 
participants could repair (i.e., on average, participants repaired on five trials during the entire 
experiment), proximity still had a significant influence on repair behavior. Thus, Experiment 3 
again suggested that both the appraisals of expectancy and proximity play a distinct role in 
emotion elicitation. 
General Discussion 
Previous research suggested that goal-incongruent events hit harder when they are 
unexpected and when the goal was just missed than when they are expected and the goal was 
missed by far. In this research, however, expectancy and proximity often were confounded. The 
aim of the present studies was to investigate whether emotions are separately enhanced by the 
appraisals of expectancy and proximity or whether only one of the two variables determines the 
emotional response. We manipulated expectancy and proximity in a gambling experiment and 
measured emotions via changes in action tendencies (the tendency to repair) and negative 
feelings (disappointment, frustration, and anger). 
Our studies suggest that expectancy and proximity each have a separate influence on 
emotions. Expectancy affected both the motivational and the feeling component of the emotion: 
Unexpected losses increased the motivation to repair a goal-incongruent event and intensified 
feelings of disappointment (all experiments) as well as feelings of frustration and anger 
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(Experiment 1 and 3) compared to expected losses. Our data thus support the idea that expecting 
to attain a goal generally amplifies negative affect when that goal is not attained. Proximity, on 
the other hand,  affected the motivational component of the emotion only. When a goal-
congruent outcome was just missed, participants’ motivation to repair a goal-incongruent event 
was stronger than when a goal-congruent outcome was missed by far. Proximity did not affect 
feelings of disappointment, frustration, and anger. 
The finding that expectancy influenced both the motivational and the feeling component 
of the emotion whereas proximity influenced the motivational component only is compatible 
with emotion theories that emphasize the importance of the appraisal of expectancy (Reisenzein, 
2009; Roseman, 2011). Importantly, our manipulation checks and motivational data excluded the 
possibility that the proximity information was simply ignored (i.e., that on trials that were used to 
calculate the effect of proximity, i.e., ABA/ABB vs. ABC trials, participants ignored the crucial 
third symbol). Construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010) might explain this pattern of 
findings via a differential impact of expectancy and proximity on the psychological distance to a 
win. Psychological distance is assumed to be influenced by the probability of a win: As the 
probability of a win increases, the psychological distance to a win decreases (Trope & Liberman, 
2010). The probability of a win is estimated as high vs. low (a) prospectively (before the loss) in 
the case of an unexpected vs. expected loss, and (b) retrospectively (after the loss) in the case of 
a proximal vs. distal loss. It could be that the psychological distance is more strongly affected by 
the probability of a win when it is estimated prospectively rather than retrospectively.  
The present findings can be relevant for the literature on emotion regulation. At first 
sight, lowering one’s expectations seems beneficial to reduce feelings of disappointment (and 
perhaps also frustration and anger) when obtaining a goal-incongruent outcome. Our studies 
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reveal, however, that such a regulation strategy could have a detrimental effect on the motivation 
to repair a goal-incongruent outcome. To the extent that repairing is possible and functional, this 
is a negative side effect. Our studies furthermore suggest that changes in the appraisal of 
proximity do not influence negative feelings but do change the tendency to repair. Thus, 
reappraising a loss as less proximal to a win may not be the most effective strategy to regulate 
feelings of disappointment, frustration, and anger. 
Future research could address a number of potential boundary conditions of the present 
findings. More specifically, our results may be bound to the use of a specific sample, a specific 
experimental context, or a specific measurement method of the tendency to repair. First, with 
regard to the specific sample, participants of Experiments 1 and 2 reported having a moderate to 
high experience with gambling. Past research has suggested that experienced gamblers may be 
more sensitive to the effects of near-misses (Habib & Dixon, 2010, but see Reid, 1986). The role 
of proximity was thus possibly overestimated in our studies. A replication with participants that 
are less experienced with gambling would solve this issue. 
Second, our results could be bound to the specific context of the slot machine game or to 
the context of gambling in general. For instance, in our experiments, the goal-incongruent events 
were caused by an external, non-living agent. The effects of expectancy and proximity may turn 
out to be different when the goal-incongruent events are caused by the self. It may be noted that 
in other, more naturalistic, settings it may be difficult to disentangle the influence of proximity 
and expectancy from each other and from other (appraisal) variables such as coping potential and 
agency. For instance, when a student receives a grade that is incongruent with his/her desired 
grade, the appraisal that the actual grade is close to the desired grade may often go together with 
the appraisal of high coping potential (i.e., the student may believe that he/she can obtain the 
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desired grade next time). Moreover, when the student had a high expectation to obtain the 
desired grade, he/she may be more likely to attribute the cause of (unexpectedly) not obtaining 
this grade externally (e.g., to an unfair grading method or professor) rather than internally (i.e., to 
the self). One other important contextual factor may be the amount of expected/unexpected and 
proximal/distal goal-incongruent trials. Although Experiment 2 partly addressed this issue, some 
questions remain unanswered, such as whether the findings of Experiment 3 would replicate 
across different trial frequencies and whether the same findings would be obtained in a single 
trial experiment. 
Third, there was a relatively high degree of coherence between the tendency to repair as 
measured via behavior and as measured via self-reports. This could be attributed to the fact that 
participants had the opportunity to reflect on their behavior in the game. In future studies, 
researchers could investigate the effects of expectancy and proximity on repair behavior that is 
measured under conditions that reduce this opportunity, such as time pressure and/or a secondary 
task that has to be completed. In this way, we could investigate whether our results generalize to 
automatically activated repair tendencies that are less easy to report.  
Our studies have other limitations that might be addressed in future research. First, the 
design of the current studies only allowed to investigate (a) the effect of expectancy within a 
context of high proximity and (b) the effect of proximity within a context of expected losses. 
Future studies may aim for a more complete design that includes unexpected distal loss trials so 
that one can examine the influence of each variable given all values of the other variable as well 
as the interaction between expectancy and proximity. There may be ways to induce 
unexpectedness without also inducing high proximity. For instance, unexpectedness could be 
induced by providing participants with information on the probability of a win before the start of 
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a trial, instead of letting them infer this from the repetition of the same symbol in AA trials. Both 
expected and unexpected losses can then be combined with the information that a win almost 
happened (i.e., proximal loss) or not (i.e., distal loss). Such an experiment would mimic 
unexpected but distal losses in real life. For example, a tennis player may have a high 
expectation of winning before the match but eventually lose the match (unexpectedly) with an 
extremely low score. It remains an empirical question whether in cases like this there is actual 
independence of expectancy and proximity or whether one variable has a systematic influence on 
the other. 
Another objection may be that the obtained differences in the tendency to repair do not 
reflect “emotional” action tendencies, but elaborated strategies to maximize one’s chances at 
winning. Deciding whether a particular action tendency or behavior is part of an emotional 
episode or not depends on one’s definition of emotions or emotional episodes. Some would 
argue that positive and negative feelings are a defining property of emotions (Ortony & Turner, 
1990) and that emotional behavior is behavior that is accompanied by positive and negative 
feelings (e.g., the affect-as-information model; Clore, 1994; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983). According to this view, one might argue that the effect of expectancy on the 
tendency to repair was more “emotional” than the effect of proximity, because on unexpected 
loss trials the feelings of disappointment, frustration and anger exceeded a threshold that could 
lead one to decide that these feelings were present (e.g., received an average rating of at least 3 
on a 7-point scale ranging from not at all to yes completely in Experiment 1 or an average rating 
of at least 25 on the visual analog scale in Experiment 3).  
Others have defined emotions as states that tilt behavior towards irrationality (but see 
Damasio, 1994; Frank, 1988; Lazarus, 1995). This idea is especially popular in folk psychology 
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(Parrott, 1995) and has some adherents in the scientific world. For instance, some researchers 
propose that emotions were adaptive for our ancestors but give rise to suboptimal or irrational 
choices in the modern world (Haselton & Ketelaar, 2006; Sripada & Stich, 2004) and that 
emotional behavior typically relies on heuristics rather than on accurate cost-benefit analyses 
(Quartz, 2009). Repair behavior can be considered as rational or as stemming from a cost-benefit 
analysis when it is more frequent on trials on which the participant believes that repairing will be 
relatively easy (i.e., coping potential is high) than on trials on which the participant believes that 
repairing will be relatively difficult (i.e., coping potential is low). In this respect, the influence of 
expectancy on repair behavior could be considered more rational and less “emotional” than the 
influence of proximity, because expectancy was related to coping potential (participants rated 
their coping potential as higher on unexpected proximal loss trials than on expected proximal 
loss trials), whereas proximity was not (participants rated their coping potential as equal on 
expected proximal loss trials than on expected distal loss trials).  
Still other emotion researchers (Scherer, 2009) suggest that emotional episodes are 
characterized by a high degree of synchronization between the components (cognitive, 
motivational, somatic, motor, and feeling). One could thus argue that the lack of significant 
correlations between feelings and the tendency to repair suggests that neither the effects of 
expectancy nor proximity are truly emotional. There are, however, several reasons not to attach 
too much weight to the correlations obtained in our studies (e.g., our small sample sizes and the 
presence of experimental manipulations which tend to push participants in the same direction 
and remove the interindividual variation that is necessary to obtain correlations). Future studies 
may investigate the presence of other criteria that have been proposed to disentangle emotional 
from non-emotional episodes, such as characteristic facial expressions (Ekman, 1994) or the 
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extent to which the action tendency takes priority over other goals (i.e., control precedence, 
Frijda, 1986). It may finally be noted that some authors argue that there are no objective criteria 
that separate emotional from non-emotional episodes (Russell, 2009). Even without consensus 
on how to classify an episode as emotional or not, studying the influence of appraisal on action 
tendencies remains valuable in its own right.  
To conclude, there is an old Taoist saying that “loss is not as bad as wanting more.” Our 
studies are the first to show that the unexpectedness of the outcome as well as the thought that a 
better outcome was within reach independently increase the motivation to obtain that outcome. 
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1 We recently discovered that a subset of our findings were replicated by another research group that 
pursued a similar line of research and did employ a trial-by-trial assessment of feelings (Junge, 
Loureiro, & Reisenzein, 2010, October). These researchers used a similar design to manipulate 
expectancy and proximity (i.e., slot-machine games) and asked participants to rate after each trial 
their disappointment about missed wins (their studies solely focused on feelings, so no action 
tendencies were measured). They also found that disappointment was influenced by the appraisal of 
expectancy but not by the appraisal of proximity.
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Table 1  
Overview of the trial types, associated appraisal values, game outcomes, and distributions in 





Outcome Exp 1 
Exp 2 
Expectancy Proximity 36-ABC/72-AAB 72-ABC/36-AAB 
ABC    
Low Low 0 cent 48 36 72 
ABA    
Low High 0 cent 24 18 18 
ABB    
Low High 0 cent 24 18 18 
AAB    
High High 0 cent 48 72 36 






Overview of the results of Experiment 1 and 2. Columns labeled AAB, ABA/ABB, and ABC contain means (SDs) of the dependent variables 
on each trial type; columns labeled expectancy and proximity present the seperate effects of expectancy and proximity (and the SDs of the 
effects); and columns labeled “Diff” presents the p-value of the difference tests between expectancy and proximity.  
  Experiment 1 Experiment 2 




 chance (%) 46.68  (16.84) 41.27 (15.92) 29.62  (17.02) 2.60  (6.25)
* 5.60 (11.68)** .17 50.32 (19.35) 44.72 (15.31) 28.47 (15.88) 5.60 (16.42)
(*) 16.25 (20.39)*** .029 
Bet  22.41  (5.85) 21.79  (6.06) 21.64  (5.81) 0.63 
 (2.02)(*) 0.15 (2.73) .51 21.07 (5.83) 20.74 (5.30) 20.37 (4.48) 0.34 (2.18) 0.37 (4.57) .98 
SR 2
nd
 chance 5.03  (1.40) 4.30  (1.43) 3.68  (1.73) 0.73 
 (1.73)* 0.62  (2.00)(*) .83 4.90 (1.32) 4.47 (1.25) 3.60 (1.87) 0.43 (1.10)
* 0.87 (1.96)* .31 
SR pass 3.19  (1.35) 3.60  (1.48) 4.30  (1.58) -0.41  (1.66) -0.70
 (2.00)* .53 3.27 (1.46) 3.83 (1.42) 4.47 (1.63) -0.57 (1.59)
* -0.63 (1.56)* .88 
SR bet 25.24  (9.40) 22.76  (11.15) 20.87  (11.10) 2.49 
 (6.33)* 1.89 (10.78) .79 21.53 (9.17) 18.27 (8.57) 16.17 (11.69) 3.27 (10.29)
(*) 2.10 (13.17) .74 
Feelings 
Disappointment 3.38  (1.89) 2.46  (1.54) 2.35  (1.55) 0.92  (1.23)*** 0.11 (1.17) .016 3.47 (1.57) 2.77 (1.44) 2.70 (1.53) 0.70 (0.99)
*** 0.07 (1.11) .061 
Frustration 2.92  (1.77) 2.24  (1.62) 2.03  (1.57) 0.68  (1.23)** 0.22 (0.82) .091 2.21 (1.37) 2.07 (1.19) 2.03 (1.18) 0.14 (0.79) 0.03 (0.42) .48 
Anger 2.35  (1.53) 1.78  (1.23) 1.78  (1.25) 0.57 (0.80)***
 











Table of correlations between the effects of expectancy as well as the effects of proximity on the 
different dependent variables: the tendency to repair as measured by the percentage of choosing 
for a second chance (BH 2
nd
), the average bet placed after choosing for a second chance (BH 
bet), the self-reported tendency to choose a second chance (SR 2
nd
),  the self-reported tendency 
to pass (SR pass), the self-reported bet (SR bet), and feelings of disappointment, frustration, and 
anger (all self-reported). 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
EXPECTANCY (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) BH 2nd                      
(2) BH bet  -.10        -12   
           
 (3) SR 2nd  .15  -.21   
    .60 *** -.28            
(4) SR pass -.13  .19  -.75 
***     -.60 ** .19  -.41 *         
(5) SR bet .06  .20  .24  -.34 
*    .11  -.17  .15  -.51 **       
(6) Disappointment .00  -.16  .20  -.18  .25    -.16  -.36 (*) .16  .02  -.04      
(7) Frustration -.06  .04  .25  -.16  .20  .66 ***  .29  -.16  .38 * -.28  -.10  .24    
 (8) Anger .18  -.18  .11  -.14  .16  .72 *** .69 * -.05  -.05  .12  .25  -.09  .09  .11  
PROXIMITY                      
(1) BH 2nd                      
(2) BH bet  .26        .02              
 (3) SR 2nd  .40 * .22       .21  .41 *           
(4) SR pass -.46 ** -.28  -.78 ***     -.32 (*) -.26  -.83 ***         
(5) SR bet .33 * .39 * .67 *** -.67 ***    .37 * .39 * .62 *** .70 ***       
(6) Disappointment .14  -.17  -.30 (*) .06  -.10    .04  -.36 (*) .07  .03  -.26      
(7) Frustration .10  .02  .10  -.04  .01  .26   .10  .07  .05  -.02  .02  .15    











Overview of the results of Experiment 3 with and without repair trials. Columns labeled AAB, ABA/ABB, and ABC contain means 
(SDs) of the dependent variables on each trial type; columns labeled expectancy and proximity present the separate effects of 
expectancy and proximity (and the SDs of the effects); columns labeled “Diff” presents the p-value of the difference tests between 
expectancy and proximity, columns labeled “CorExpectancy” and “CorProximity” present the correlations between the effects of 
expectancy as well as the effects of proximity on the different dependent variables. 
 
    CorExpectancy CorProximity 
  AAB ABA/ABB ABC Expectancy Proximity Diff  (1) (2) (1) (2) 
(1) Disappointment 
incl. repair 34.08 (27.48) 25.35 (24.46) 25.52 (23.56) 8.73 (9.90)
*** -0.17 (10.16) .002          
excl. repair 32.58 (27.28) 25.31 (24.48) 25.89 (24.03) 7.26
 (9.38)***  -0.57 (9.64) .002          
(2) Frustration 
incl. repair 29.58 (27.18) 26.20 (25.79) 24.09 (23.43) 3.38
 (9.18)* 2.11 (9.66) .60  .00    .52 
**   
excl. repair 29.85 (27.88) 25.33 (25.00) 24.38 (23.75) 4.51 (9.06)
** 0.95 (10.32) .14  .13    .38 
*   
(3) Anger 
incl. repair 22.32 (26.95) 17.17 (19.57) 16.87 (19.59) 5.15
 (9.94)** 0.30 (8.92) .033  .33 
(*) .20  .52 ** .30 (*) 
excl. repair 22.67 (27.69) 17.58 (20.83) 17.09 (20.60) 5.09 (9.79)** 0.49 (9.01) .036  .12  .31 
(*) .53 ** .25  
Note: 
(*)
 p < .10, 
*
 p< .05, 
**
 p < .01,
 ***






Figure 1. The slot machine with the three slots (upper part), the three information boxes (middle 
part), and the three spin buttons (lower part). 
 
